The LSV seminar takes place on Tuesday at 11:00 AM. The usual location is the conference room at Pavillon des Jardins (venue). If you wish to be informed by e-mail about upcoming seminars, please contact Stéphane Le Roux and Matthias Fuegger.
The seminar is open to public and does not require any form of registration.
In a context of competition, information – who knows what and before whom – plays a crucial role. Here, we concentrate on three models where the concept of information is present: Kuhn’s extensive tree model (K-model), Alos-Ferrer and Ritzberger infinite tree model (AFR-model) and Witsenhausen model (W-model). Whereas a tree is given in both K- and AFR-models among the primitives, in the W-model it is rather an object that can possibly be induced by a proper information structure. We study whether AFR- and W-models have the same potential to model games. We start by an example of Witsenhausen of a playable game without any possible tree structure. All along, we provide illustrations of the power and simplicity of the W-model to handle information in a strategic context and correspondences between the information structures (perfect recall of past actions/information, absent-mindedness). Witsenhausen introduces the property of causality. Then, he designs a simple recursive algorithm that leads to solvability for any pure strategy profile. Our research agenda is to prove than, under causality, we can devise an analogous algorithm that, given a behaviour strategy profile, results in a unique probability distribution over the outcomes, the property that we call behavioral solvability. In the second part of the talk, we define the class of Principal-Agent games with what we call, an enough informed Agent, and find Nash equilibria of such games by means of backward induction (bilevel optimization). (joint work with Michel De Lara and Jean-Philippe Chancelier)